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Introduction  
Property taxation has tremendous potential for mobilizing improved revenue and equity, 
especially in transitional and developing countries. Currently the property tax generates 0.3-0.6% of 
GDP for developing and transitional countries and up to 2-3% of GDP for OECD countries (Bahl 
and Martinez Vasquez, 2008; Bird and Slack, 2004). This international benchmarking suggests a 
high potential for significant increases in property tax revenues, along with improvements in equity 
and efficiency, especially in transitional and developing countries. 
To realize these potential property tax revenue improvements, countries must undertake 
strategic reform, combining policy and administrative interactions to improve tax base coverage, 
property valuations, collection, enforcement and taxpayer services. The tax policy reforms must 
adjust tax base definitions and tax rate structures along with making appropriate policy decisions 
linked to valuation standards, appeals, collection and enforcement. The tax administrative reforms 
must focus on improving tax base coverage, valuation, and collection, along with taxpayer services.  
A major constraint to improving the property tax in transitional and developing countries is 
weak administration, often a result of political, institutional and capacity constraints. Property tax 
reforms must be designed cognizant of these constraints, the existing reform environment, legal and 
institutional structures, government administration capacities, and political will, as all tax reforms 
must be country specific, adapting international best practice to each unique reform environment. 
Major administrative reforms, undertaken within a proper property tax policy framework, are 
crucial to ensure sustainable implementation of a more equitable and efficient property tax system.  
Realizing improvements in property tax revenue, equity and efficiency objectives requires a 
multi-year, systematic and comprehensive property tax reform. Although property tax policy can be 
adjusted overnight, international experience confirms that the translation of those policy and 
administrative changes into enhanced revenues, efficiency and equity will take time. Although 
certain reforms may yield immediate improvements in property tax revenues, generally speaking, 
property tax reform must be implemented so as to allow sufficient time for longer term, systemic 
and institutional reform.  
Ideally property tax reform should be structured as an integral part of broader public sector 
management reforms, such as fiscal decentralization and governance, public financial management, 
local government and urban development reform. This will help create demand support for the 
reform, making it easier to mobilize a broader set of the key stakeholders and resources, balance the 
impacts and incentives of other reform initiatives, minimize political, administrative and taxpayer 
opposition and generate the synergy needed to design, implement and sustain a successful property 
tax reform. Successful property tax system can then help support these other reforms seeking to 
enhance responsive, efficient and accountable government and improved public service delivery.  
As with any reform, making the property tax work requires visionary leadership, an 
appropriate policy framework, strong administrative capacity, and appropriate incentives to 
mobilize the political, administrative and popular support needed to enhance property tax revenues, 
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equity and efficiency. This paper focuses on these requirements for successful property tax reform, 
identifying the key policy and administrative components and possible strategies needed to make 
the property tax work.  
Part 1 outlines the broader public sector reform environment needed to facilitate and support 
sustainable property tax reform. Part 2 identifies the policy and administration determinants 
affecting the realization of property tax revenue, equity and efficiency outcomes. Part 3 focuses on 
the ingredients needed to design a successful reform implementation strategy, while Part 4 
summarizes the key recommendations for making the property tax work, especially in transitional 
and developing countries.  
1. The Broader Reform Environment  
Countries everywhere are in the midst of development reforms to promote growth and 
improve living standards. These reforms are focusing on enhancing private sector led economic 
growth, adopting effective public sector regulations and improving efficient and accountable public 
service delivery. While the private sector focuses its entrepreneurial energies to maximize market 
efficiency, governments are focusing their fiscal attention on issues of macroeconomic stabilization, 
distribution and allocation. 
Although stabilization and distribution functions are largely central government 
responsibilities, the allocation functions are joint responsibilities of both central and local 
governments, depending largely on the geographic scope of the public good (Musgrave, 1989; 
Oates, 1999, 2005). Based on the subsidiarity principle, public goods and services are to be 
provided by the lowest level of government that can do so efficiently. This implies that most public 
expenditure functions should be assigned to local governments, with the exception of those 
functions with economies of scale and/or inter-jurisdictional spillovers such as national defense, 
monetary policy, water basin management, among others.  
Virtually all governments have adopted variants of decentralization reforms to improve 
public service efficiency, encourage more accountable and responsive governance, and promote 
more equitable distribution of services throughout the country. The goal is to bring public sector 
decisions closer to the people so as to empower local communities to actively participate in 
prioritizing, implementing and monitoring government resources to enhance efficiency with 
public and social accountability (Boex and Kelly, forthcoming). To be successful, these 
decentralization reforms necessarily involve a combination of political, administrative and fiscal 
aspects (Boex and Yilmaz, 2010), which must be strategically implemented in a country-specific 
approach (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2006). 
‘Finance should follow Function’ is a fiscal decentralization rule stressing the need to 
provide appropriate funding for the expenditure functions allocated to local governments (Bahl, 
1999). This requires a system of shared taxes, intergovernmental transfers and local own-source 
revenues, the mix depending on the nature of the allocated functions. Although intergovernmental 
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transfers and shared taxes typically dominate the financing framework, local own revenues, 
although perhaps small, are critically important to enhance local autonomy, governance 
accountability, ownership and responsibility, while providing an important source of additional 
funding (at the margin) for local budgets.  
Although largely dependent on central-local transfers, local governments everywhere tend to 
rely on fees and charges, business licenses, and the property tax for their own source revenues, with 
some local governments given access to broader taxes on motor vehicle, sales and income. The 
property tax currently finances about 40-80% of local government expenditures in OECD countries 
and between 20-80% in developing / transitional countries (Bahl and Martinez-Vasquez, 2008). It 
has been suggested that the property tax should be able to yield between 1-2% of GDP and serve as 
the core local tax source for local governments throughout the world (UN-HABITAT, 2011). 
Theory and international best practice identify the property tax as the ideal local tax to 
support ongoing fiscal decentralization strategies. The property tax has strong potential for revenue 
mobilization, especially in rapidly urbanizing areas. The tax base is immobile which minimizes 
economic efficiency implications and makes it easy to be identified and be captured and allows the 
properties to be the natural collateral in cases of nonpayment. Due to its immobility, the property tax 
base also captures the value of location-specific capital investments and benefits from government 
programs and services not captured otherwise through various fees, user charges and taxes. The 
property tax also, in many countries, tends to fall on those with the ability to pay, as immovable 
property can be the primary repository of wealth. And finally, as a highly visible and politically 
sensitive revenue instrument, the property tax can serve as a perfect tax to encourage more 
responsive, efficient and accountable local governments. 
Despite being an ideal tax for local governments, with tremendous revenue potential, 
property taxes in most transitional and developing countries face a number of challenges emanating 
from central and local level political, institutional and administrative problems. At the central 
government level, reform measures must ensure that local governments are empowered with the 
responsibility, capacity and resources to effectively implement the property tax. At the local level, 
local governments must be given the adequate and necessary discretion, along with accountability 
constraints, to influence property tax policy and its administration (at the margin) and effectively 
link property tax revenue mobilization with improved levels of responsive, efficient and accountable 
service delivery.  
Reforms should to be structured to reduce excessive central government indirect and direct 
interference. For example, central governments should design their intergovernmental transfers and 
shared taxes so as to minimize disincentives for mobilizing local revenues; while the central 
government must be also constrained from intervening with ad hoc policy changes (eg, granting 
special exemptions and curtailing local tax rates) and/or administrative regulations which can 
dramatically discourage local incentives to mobilize revenue.  
 Making the Property Tax Work  5 
 
5 
 
Reforms at the local level should create an enabling environment to empower local 
governments to effectively enhance governance and improve public service delivery. Strengthened 
political legitimacy and credibility will better enable local governments to be more responsive and 
work with their residents to mobilize additional tax revenues needed for identified local expenditure 
priorities. Enabling local governments to deliver high quality services and to effectively link 
property taxes with high quality services will encourage greater voluntary compliance and grant 
local governments the legitimacy and credibility to undertake enforcement against non-compliance.  
 To be successful, property tax reforms should be linked in a “demand-driven” fashion to the 
broader public sector reforms such as decentralization, in order to build on the momentum, the 
stakeholder interest, the political will and the available institutional, financial and human resources. 
Isolated ‘supply driven’ reforms rarely gain sufficient traction to generate sustainable momentum. 
Thus, a key design strategy for successful property tax reform could be to anchor the property tax as 
an integral and pivotal component of the broader decentralization reforms in a country. In this way, 
the property tax reform could become a demand-driven activity needed to support the broader 
public sector reform objective. And the purpose of the property tax reform then moves beyond just 
strengthening the property tax itself, to becoming a means of supporting the broader vision to 
improve the efficiency and accountability of governance and service delivery.  
 To ensure that the property tax can deliver the revenues, equity and efficiency needed to 
support the broader decentralization reforms, reformers must focus attention on identifying the 
required policy and administration components and then designing and implementing an appropriate 
reform implementation strategy to make the property tax work.  
2. Property Tax Policy and Administration  
 Within the broader political economy environment, reformers must clearly understand the 
key economic, policy and administration determinants of property taxation in order to design and 
implement appropriate, effective and sustainable interventions. As the property tax revenue identity 
equation shown below indicates, policy and administration factors closely interact to affect the 
equity and efficiency of property tax revenue mobilization (Linn, 1980; Kelly, 2000, forthcoming; 
UN-HABITAT, 2011).  
 The policy factors focus primarily on the structure of the tax base and tax rates which 
determine the legal tax capacity; while the administration factors directly affect the realization 
of that tax capacity through the tax base coverage (CVR), the valuation (VR) and the collection 
(CLR) ratios. In short, property tax revenues are equal to the tax base multiplied by the tax rate, 
adjusted for the administrative ability to capture the properties on the tax rolls, estimate accurate 
property valuations, and assess and collect the tax liability, all affected by the quality of taxpayer 
service.  
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Tax Revenue =  [Tax Base * TR]   *   [CVR * VR * CLR] 
      [Policy Variables]   [Administrative Variables] 
 
The Policy Variables: 
a. The Tax Base is defined by government policy in terms of what is and is not included 
in the tax base, and on the basis on which the tax will be levied (ie, area or value).  
b. The Tax Rate (TR) is defined by government policy to be the tax amount per value of 
a property under an ad valorem property tax system, or by the amount per unit of 
property under a pure area-based rating system. 
The Administrative Variables 
3. The Coverage Ratio (CVR) is defined as the amount of taxable property captured in the 
tax registry, divided by the total taxable property in a jurisdiction. This ratio measures the 
completeness of the tax roll information and is determined by the administrative efficiency 
of identifying and capturing property data using field surveys, secondary property 
information, and/or taxpayer-provided information, and ensuring the correct application of 
legally approved exemptions, reductions and tax relief policies.  
4. The Valuation Ratio (VR) is defined as the value on the valuation rolls divided by the 
real market value of properties on the valuation roll. This ratio measures the accuracy of the 
property valuation level (ie, what percent of market value is being captured through the 
valuation process). The valuation ratio level is determined primarily by the frequency and 
accuracy of the property valuation process.  
5. The Collection Ratio (CLR) is defined as the annual tax revenue collected over total tax 
liability billed. This ratio measures collection efficiency on both current liability and tax 
arrears, determined largely by political will, taxpayer service and the effective use of 
incentives, sanctions and penalties.  
The administration variables can be grouped into those related to tax base administration (ie, 
coverage and valuation) and those related to the treasury functions of billing, collection, and 
enforcement (ie, captured under the collection ratio). These two separate but complementary 
groupings are important when structuring tax administration options so as to take advantage of 
distinct skill capacities, economies of scale, and avoidance of conflicts of interest and possible 
collusion. 
To make the property tax work, reformers need to identify a strategy to combine and 
sequence an appropriate set of policy and administrative interventions which can be accepted, 
adopted, implemented and sustained in an efficient and equitable manner. Any set of policies 
chosen must be implementable, linked to political, institutional and administrative realities. Policy 
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choices may identify the potential property tax benefits, but it is the quality of administration that 
will enable governments to realize those property tax revenue and equity objectives.  
Policy choices appropriate for one reform environment may not necessarily be appropriate 
for another reform environment. While the same theories may apply to every situation, the exact 
mix of policy and administrative reform interventions will necessarily vary, cognizant of the unique 
reform environment inherent in each situation. Herein lies the art of property tax reform. For the 
reform artist to be successful, the artist must understand the theory, the unique reform environment, 
and the array of policy and administrative alternatives and then creatively adapt and craft these 
various components into an appropriate, successful property tax reform strategy.  
Let us now explore these components, focusing first on policy choices and administration 
options, followed by implementation strategy considerations. We will then summarize key 
recommendations for making the property tax work. 
2.1. Exploring the Property Tax Base  
 Property tax policy must define the composition of the tax base and the structure of the tax 
rates, along with the definition of the taxpayer (owner, occupier and/or beneficiary), valuation 
standards (valuation—capital or annual rental value—or area basis) and the related assessment, 
billing, collection, enforcement and dispute resolution issues. There are strong similarities, yet 
with interesting diversity, in the policy choices adopted by different countries across income 
levels, geographic and population size, legal and institutional systems, political and 
administration structures, historical legacies and the degree of decentralization, among others 
[Almy (2001), Bahl (2009), Bahl, Martinez-Vasquez and Youngman (2008, 2010), Bird and 
Slack (2004), De Cesare, 2012, Franzsen and McCluskey (2005), Kelly (2000, 2001, 2004, 
forthcoming), McCluskey (1999), Rosengard (1998), UN-HABITAT (2011), Youngman and 
Malme (1994, 2002)].  
 To quickly summarize, countries typically define the immovable property tax base to 
include both land and improvements (eg, buildings), although there are some countries that only tax 
land (eg, Jamaica, Kenya, New Zealand and Australia) or only improvements (eg, Ghana, 
Tanzania). Many taxing jurisdictions also include machinery and equipment in their tax base (eg., 
US and Canada). There are advantages and disadvantages with each tax base definition, and there 
are strong advocates arguing for each alternative. However, regardless of the actual tax base chosen, 
countries typically define that tax base coverage as broadly as possible to ensure the capture of 
adequate revenue in an efficient and equitable manner.  
 The tax base definition as to whether the property tax will be levied on land and/or building 
and/or equipment is not the major policy challenge. The real challenge is defining what will not be 
included in the tax base, that is, the exemptions and related tax expenditures. Although there are 
commonalities, tax base exemptions vary across taxing jurisdictions, based on such factors as 
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nationality, ownership, property use, property characteristics and/or characteristics of the property 
owners / occupier.  
 Although many exemptions may be well intentioned, reformers must recognize that all 
exemptions are implicit subsidies or tax expenditures affecting both revenue and economic 
behavior, which can in turn impact efficiency and equity. International best practice would be to 
minimize the number of exemptions and tax relief schemes, while more effectively targeting the 
remainder, so as to best achieve intended government objectives at least economic, administrative 
and compliance cost.  
 However, reforming these exemptions can be challenging. Aside from the political 
difficulties of dealing with constituencies affected by these exemptions, reformers are confronted by 
the difficulty of even identifying the magnitude of existing exemptions, as exemptions are often 
spread throughout multiple laws including the Valuation for Rating Act, the Property Tax Act, and a 
myriad of other miscellaneous laws on foreign and domestic investment, economic development, 
mining, sector specific laws linked to hotels and tourism, commercial development, 
cinematography, among others. This fragmentation of exemptions, spread throughout different 
legislations and granted by different agencies, makes the reform process a technical, institutional 
and political challenge, especially in developing countries. 
 The common property tax exemption across all countries is diplomatic property based on 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Countries also typically exempt government-
owned properties used for government purposes, although some countries provide for a 
Contribution in Lieu of Rates (Kenya), Payment in Lieu of Tax (PILT) (Canada and US) or Grants 
in Lieu of Taxes (Provincial Level in Canada).
1
 And there are also some countries that explicitly tax 
government property either at the full rate (South Africa) or at reduced differential rates (Malawi 
with a 50% reduction and Namibia with a 20% reduction) (Kelly et al, 2001, Franzen, 2012).  
 Exemptions are also usually given to properties owned by religious institutions but limited 
to places of worship or other limited religious purposes. Education and health properties are often 
given a full exemption; although some countries provide only a partial exemption by taxing 
privately-owned facilities at a reduced tax rate (South Africa), while other countries provide an 
option for voluntary Payments in Lieu of Taxes (USA) (Kenyon and Langley, 2010). Although 
there may be a constitutional or legal rationale for granting exemptions for religious, educational 
and medical facilities, it is also economically rational to allow some level of exemption / tax relief 
in light of possible positive social externalities generated from these properties.  
                                                 
1
 See Corn (2012) on the PILT (USA), Government of Canada (2012) on the PILT for the Government of Canada, 
Muniscope (2010) on Provincial level ‘Grants in Lieu of Taxes’ to municipalities, and Kelly (2000) on Contribution 
in Lieu of Rates (Kenya).  
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 Countries also commonly provide an exemption threshold to eliminate low value properties 
from paying the property tax, although some countries require every property to pay at least a 
minimum tax amount for services (Jamaica, Latvia, State of Hawaii, Perth, Australia) (UN-
HABITAT, 2011; Perth, 2012). In Latin America it is common to provide exemptions/tax relief for 
social purposes aimed at low income families, widows, retired and elderly people, pensioners and 
orphans (De Cesare, 2012). 
 There are also exemptions, especially in developing countries, which are given to a large 
portion of the potential property tax base, such as residential properties and agricultural properties. 
Although the rationale given is a mixture of concerns for equity, administrative efficiency and 
political expedience, these exemptions can have major implications on equity, efficiency and 
revenue, depending on how they are structured.  
 For example, poor small subsistence farmers, especially in developing countries, should 
perhaps be exempt from property taxation to improve equity. In fact, taxing small rural farmers can 
cost more in administration and compliance costs than the amount of revenue collected, plus 
governments often provide very minimal public services to these rural properties. The same logic, 
however, does not apply to large commercial farmers. Countries which currently do not tax 
agricultural properties (eg, Tanzania, Guinea and Tunisia) should perhaps explore options to tax at 
least large commercial agricultural properties through introducing a minimum area rate on large 
commercial farmers.  
 Another popular exemption is the granting of tax relief to residential properties. In some 
countries, the push is to exempt all residential properties while in others it is to grant a single 
exemption to the owner-occupied residential unit (Egypt, Indonesia). While providing a blanket 
exemption for all residential properties may be politically expedient to garner popular support, it 
can generate a large loss in foregone revenue and dramatically impact equity, without effectively 
targeting those most in need of tax relief.  
 Developing countries overall face a major administrative constraint in trying to target 
exemptions. For example, granting a single owner-occupied exemption requires tax departments 
to be able to link the property (ie, the tax object) uniquely to the taxpayer (ie, the tax subject) and 
to be able to verify that the person living in the house is the owner and is only receiving one 
exemption across all jurisdictions. This proves virtually impossible to implement and enforce in 
countries with limited coverage of legal and fiscal cadastres and a lack of information sharing 
across taxing jurisdictions. Thus, although well intentioned and designed to promote greater 
equity, such policies are often thwarted in practice during implementation in developing 
countries.  
 Another set of exemptions often given are those linked to promoting economic 
development, which are quite common in OECD countries. The expectation is that these 
exemptions will attract and stimulate economic investment and growth to a specific region and/or to 
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specific areas within a city. Although quite popular among politicians and the business community, 
studies tend to conclude there is little evidence that these tax exemptions are effective (Kenyon, 
Langley and Paquin, 2012). In general, the lesson is that the property tax should be seen primarily as 
a revenue instrument, not as a tool to fine tune economic development and/or affect land use 
development patterns. 
Theory and international experience confirms that poorly designed and poorly implemented 
tax exemptions can dramatically reduce the effectiveness of the property tax, creating a drain on 
revenues, increasing inequity among taxpayers and introducing major inefficient behavior and 
distortions. These exemptions play havoc with the tax base making it imperative for reformers to 
carefully review, evaluate, redesign and monitor the exemption structure to ensure that any expected 
social and economic objectives are being obtained at the least economic, administrative and 
compliance cost. This requires a political and technical process, with reformers recognizing that the 
political aspects often dominate the policy discussion.  
2.2 Exploring the Tax Rates 
The second important policy choice is the determination of the tax rate structure. Once 
again, there is diversity throughout the world, with some jurisdictions levying a uniform single tax 
rate (either on a percentage basis or as a unit rate) while others apply differential rates across types 
or uses of property (eg, a classified tax rate structure). Still other jurisdictions levy the tax on a 
progressive rate, taxing higher value properties at a higher marginal percentage rate. Other countries 
require a uniform tax rate to be used, but do allow for valuation assessment ratios to vary by type of 
property, effectively allowing for a classified effective tax rate structure (Philippines) (Guevara, 
2003). Given the often complex structure of the tax liability assessment process, reformers need to 
fully understand the explicit statutory tax rate structure and the underlying effective tax rate 
structure. 
Applying a uniform legal tax rate on all properties allows the property tax liability to vary 
only by the differences in the property valuation. A high value residential property would therefore 
pay the same amount as an equal value commercial or agricultural property. The tax would be truly 
an “ad valorem” tax, with the amount of the tax based solely on the property value, not a function of 
differential land use and/or ownership tenure. The property value itself would capture any 
differentiations caused by characteristics such as location, size, property use and ownership rights.  
In terms of administrative feasibility, a uniform rate simplifies administration and reduces 
discretion during the tax liability assessment process. In many developing countries with weak 
zoning and land use regulations, tax officials must use discretionary judgment to classify and 
determine the appropriate tax rate for each property use when properties have multiple uses—such 
as a residential property also serving as a medical clinic. Discretion, without clear accountability 
oversight mechanisms, can lead to the misapplication of the expected tax rate policy, leading to loss 
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in revenues, equity and efficiency. It is therefore recommended, whenever possible, that a uniform 
tax rate be applied in developing countries. 
However, many countries adopt a classified system, allowing the property tax rate to vary 
by property use and tenure. Although there may be legitimate policy reasons for doing so, it appears 
that the introduction of differential tax rates may be largely for political reasons. For example, lower 
tax rates on agricultural land provides a subsidy to agriculture, taking pressure off those agricultural 
properties located at the urban fringe to be converted from agriculture to urban land use.  
Higher tax rates on commercial and industrial properties are often justified as ‘fair’ based on 
the business’s “ability to pay” as a cash generating operation and with the argument that the 
business properties are not fully paying for the benefits they received from the government. 
However, the incidence of a business tax is quite complex, as property taxes levied on businesses 
may not be fully borne by the business owners but rather shifted backwards to the factors of 
production and forward to consumers in various ways, affecting both equity and efficiency. In terms 
of capturing the benefits enjoyed by businesses, studies in Canada and the US show that the 
business sector is often overtaxed in terms of the net benefits received, thus there are economic 
arguments to lower the property tax rate on business properties (Kitchen, 2005). Taxing business 
properties above the threshold of benefits received allows local governments to ‘export’ the tax to 
non-residents, breaking the efficiency linkage between local expenditures and local revenues. 
In developing countries, however, where commercial properties may not be fully paying for 
the local services received through user fees and local level income and consumption taxes, there 
may be a greater justification for applying a higher property tax rate on commercial properties as a 
‘benefit tax’ for locally-provided public services. 
Some countries have chosen to apply progressive tax rates based on the individual property 
value (eg, Colombia, Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala, Peru and Brazil, Egypt India) (De Cesare, 2012, 
Kelly, 2011, NIUA, 2010).
2
 The use of progressive rates is rationalized as a way of shifting the 
property tax burden to those properties with a higher “ability to pay.” The validity of this argument 
is questionable, however, since there is little correlation between a property and taxpayer income. 
That is, there are many low value properties owned by wealthy taxpayers while there are higher 
value properties owned by “asset rich-cash poor” taxpayers.  
Most countries do not use progressive tax rate structures for their property taxes, but reserve 
the use of progressive rate structures for their income taxes. The only country that has successfully 
applied the property tax progressively on the comprehensive value of all land and residential 
properties is the Republic of Korea under their national-level Comprehensive Real Estate Holding 
                                                 
2
 NIUA (2010) reports wide variation in a country as diverse as India. Ahmedabad, Chennai, Indore, Kulkata, and 
Pune apply progressive rates; while Bangalore, Ludhiana, and Patna use a classified tax system applying a flat rate 
differentiated by residential and non-residential.  
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Tax, which is applied on top of the regular property tax (Government of Korea, Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance, 2012). The Korean government is able to link the property ownership records with 
family registration records to aggregate total property holdings for progressive taxation. In most 
countries, however, comprehensively linking properties to individual owners is virtually impossible 
and thus it is administratively impossible to tax immovable property progressively in a 
comprehensive manner. And, in fact, the Government of Korea announced in 2008 that the 
Comprehensive Real Estate Tax will be replaced overtime with a tax on the wealthy, with short 
term changes introduced on its administration from 2012 (Chosun, 2008). 
Rather than taxing properties under a progressive rate structure, most countries tend to adopt 
simpler property tax rate structures to ensure transparent and accountable revenues. Even countries 
which previously applied complex progressive rates are shifting to simpler tax rate regimes. For 
example, in 2005, Jamaica shifted from its complex, progressive rate structure for its annual 
property tax to a simple flat rate structure to remove the tax rate complexity and improve tax 
payment compliance.
3
 Shifting away from a progressive rate structure can have a number of 
advantages: First, it can reduce the incentive to sub-divide property for purely tax purposes. 
Second, it can lower the tax burden on high value properties, which may encourage greater levels of 
tax compliance. Third, it can eliminate the problem with bracket creep, where properties can 
naturally fall into the higher tax brackets as property values naturally increase, unless the brackets 
are indexed to the general property value increases. Fourth, it can make it easier to adjust the rate 
over time (Sjoquist, 2004).  
Although a uniform tax rate may be the ideal option for developing and transitional 
countries, it often proves to be politically difficult, forcing countries to introduce multiple rates to 
cater to specific groups of properties. In countries that do adopt a classified tax rate structure , the 
number of different tax rates should, to the extent possible, be kept to a minimum, with perhaps a 
maximum of three tax rates being differentiated for agriculture, residential and non-residential 
properties.  
 
Reformers should recognize that, unless the property tax is being administered effectively, 
the differential rates prescribed under the law may not necessarily be the same differential rates 
applied in practice. Therefore some tax systems require higher level government to provide 
oversight and approval to ensure a minimum quality of tax administration before being granted 
permission to adopt a classified tax rate structure (eg, Department of Revenue in MA, US).  
 
                                                 
3 
Jamaica simplified its tax rate structure by removing bands and caps, introducing a flat rate of J$600 for values up to a 
threshold of $300,000, and a flat rate of 0.5% on the amount in excess of $300,000. In 2010, the tax rates were adjusted 
upwards to a flat J$1,000 for values up to $300,000, with a flat rate of 0.75% for amounts in excess of J$300,000. See 
http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20100425/business/business4.html. 
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  In order to effectively link property tax reform to fiscal decentralization efficiency and 
accountability objectives, reformers need to allow a degree of tax rate setting powers to the local 
government level. A degree of local tax rate discretion is critically important for the 
decentralization process as it can improve economic efficiency, allowing local governments to 
establish their spending priorities and set the tax rate to realize revenue needed in accordance 
with local demand. In addition, rate setting power can strengthen the assembly’s accountability 
with its citizens, encouraging residents to monitor both the revenue collection and local 
expenditures more carefully (Bird and Bahl, 2008; UN-HABITAT, 2011).  
 
Despite the importance of granting tax rate discretion to the local level, in reality, there 
are many countries in which the tax rate is determined by the central government, with no 
discretion given to local governments. For example, most countries in Latin America have 
property tax rates set by the central government, with the exception of municipalities in 
Colombia, Ecuador and Honduras, which have the power to set rates within a range defined in 
national legislation (De Cesare, 2012). In transitional countries, the national government usually 
sets the tax rate, with two notable exceptions, namely Estonia and Poland, where municipalities 
are allowed to set their own rates within limits imposed by a senior level of government 
(Youngman and Malme, 2002). In North America, Europe and Asia, however, local governments 
are largely given the power to set their tax rates, at least within limits established by the central 
government legislation. Indonesia’s recent property tax devolution reform in 2010 provides a 
good example of local governments being granted tax rate discretion specifically to support 
decentralization reforms (Kelly, 2012).  
 
To conclude, as regards tax rate policy choices, theory and international best practice 
suggest the need to allocate the property tax rate setting (at the margin) to the local government 
for efficiency and accountability reasons. A combination of central level and citizen oversight of 
rate setting is important to ensure achievement of the revenue, equity and efficiency objectives. 
To the extent possible, reformers should push for a uniform tax rate to simplify administration, 
allowing a greater focus on improving property tax administration linked to coverage, valuation 
and collection ratios. In the event that a classified system is inevitable, the number of tax rates 
should be kept to a minimum to avoid unintended major distortions in revenue, equity and 
efficiency.  
However, all government policies on the tax base and tax rates are only effective if these 
are implemented in a consistent, accountable and transparent manner. The implementation 
success is dependent upon the quality of tax administration as discussed in the following section.   
2.3 Exploring Tax Administration Coverage, Valuation and Collection 
 “Tax Administration is Tax Policy” is now a well-recognized statement emphasizing the 
importance of tax administration in realizing any tax policy objectives (Casanegera de Jantscher, 
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1990). Although tax policy choices are obviously important, the larger challenge is always in 
implementing those policies, especially in developing countries with weak administration capacity. 
  Property taxation is a very administrative-intensive tax which requires proactive, intentional 
tax base identification, tax base valuation, tax liability assessment, tax billing and collection, tax 
enforcement, and taxpayer service and dispute resolution (Mikesell, 2007). These various 
administrative functions must operate in an integrated manner, interactively supporting the 
achievement of the revenue, equity and efficiency objectives. While all of the administrative 
functions contribute to defining the potential tax revenue, it is the collection function that is vital to 
transforming these potential to reality. Reformers need to recognize this crucial role of the collection 
function when designing the administrative priorities and sequencing the property tax reform 
implementation strategy (Kelly, 2000, forthcoming).  
 To improve the administration efficiency, property tax departments everywhere are 
structuring themselves along functional responsibilities, separating the fiscal cadastre functions (ie, 
tax base identification and valuation) from treasury functions (ie, tax liability assessment, tax billing 
collection, and tax enforcement) to allow for specialization and to minimize possible conflict of 
interest and collusion opportunities. Throughout the world, dispute resolution and taxpayer service 
functions are managed separately to ensure independent objectivity and service to taxpayers on 
issues related to the fiscal cadastre and treasury functions. 
2.3.1 Exploring the Property Tax Coverage Ratio  
 The first step in property tax administration is to assemble and maintain property tax base 
information, which involves the collection, recording and management of property information on 
both land and improvements, in accordance with the legal tax base definition. The tax base must be 
identified before one can tax that base.  
 Case studies in developing countries suggest that the coverage ratio for the property tax may 
range from 40-80% (Bird and Slack, 2004, Kelly, 2000, De Cesare, 2012, UN-HABITAT, 2011). 
The challenge is to ensure that this basic information is complete, up-to-date and accurate—that is, 
to maintain the coverage ratio as close to 100 percent as possible so as to capture the total potential 
tax base.  
 To do this in a timely and cost-effective manner, governments are increasingly following a 
partnership approach, where the government works together with taxpayers and 3
rd
 party 
government and private sector agencies and individuals handling property tax-related information to 
collect information on taxpayers and the properties. This partnership approach to fiscal cadastre 
maintenance essentially outsources the information collection and updating process to reduce direct 
tax administration costs, while improving information availability. The limited government tax 
administration resources can then be focused selectively on auditing the submitted information and 
undertaking active field work where appropriate to ensure an accurate coverage ratio. 
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 Property tax legislation and regulations typically require taxpayers to self-declare taxpayer 
and property characteristics (including physical and valuation-related information). The taxpayer 
self-declaration process is common in all property tax jurisdictions, but is often confused with self-
valuation and self-assessment. Although each approach involves a taxpayer declaration of 
information which affects the quality of the coverage ratio, the self-valuation procedure also 
involved the taxpayer in the valuation, assessment and payment components of the collection 
ratio, while the self-assessment procedure involves the taxpayer in the coverage ratio, relies on 
the government for the valuation ratio and then relies on the taxpayer for the assessment and 
payment components of the collection ratio. While various countries may try either one or 
several of these approaches, reformers must understand the implications of each approach when 
designing a strategy to improve overall property tax administration.  
 In addition to taxpayers reporting on their individual property information, countries also 
often require 3
rd
 party public and private sector agencies and individuals to submit their property-
related information to the tax department in a timely manner. These 3
rd
 party agencies and 
individuals would include the Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Public Housing, Ministry of 
Lands, Surveyor General, Titles Registry as well as all private sector agencies, such as utility 
companies, real estate agents, rental agencies, notaries, lawyers, banks, and others. Failure to submit 
this information should result in appropriate penalties.  
  One key to this partnership approach is to determine the minimum needed property-related 
information, design the data capture mechanism (either manual or digital) and implement a 
systematic capture, processing and analysis of the taxpayer and third party information, 
accompanied by an appropriate awareness, education and support campaign. The property 
declaration / reporting form should be simple, user friendly and strictly limited to information 
needed to build and maintain the fiscal cadastre. Information collected but not used to improve the 
coverage, valuation and collection ratios is very costly.  
 One challenge to this partnership arrangement in developing countries is that many 3
rd
 party 
agencies are also in a process of institutional development and reform, focusing on trying to 
improve the quality of their own information management and service related activities. Thus, any 
property tax reform effort towards improving the fiscal cadastre is also dependent on the quality and 
timing of these other agency reforms. And, as international experience confirms, information 
sharing across agencies is not solely a technical exercise but faces many institutional and procedural 
constraints to inhibit the free flow of accurate and timely information to support property tax reform 
administration. 
 As part of the partnership approach to fiscal cadastre information maintenance, tax 
departments must occasionally take proactive action to undertake field work, in order to audit the 
taxpayer declarations and 3
rd
 party information as well as to conduct systematic property tax 
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coverage activities to identify properties, collect and manage relevant information and maintain and 
use that information to ensure the fiscal cadastre is complete and up to date.  
 This proactive approach is also required to initially build a tax registry, update a tax registry 
after a period of no maintenance or when conducting a major property valuation reassessment. 
Increasingly, simple, field based procedures, accompanied by appropriate technology are being 
used, as illustrated in the Philippines (Dillinger, 1991), Indonesia (Kelly, 1996), and most recently 
as reported in Somaliland, among others (UN-HABITAT, 2011). 
 To take advantage of economies of scale, ensure equitable treatment in application and 
overcome capacity constraints, there are strong arguments to involve central government in fiscal 
cadastre maintenance activities, including property valuation (Mikesell, 2007). Many countries 
depend heavily on central government to directly support the property tax cadastre and valuation 
(Colombia, Jamaica, Bahamas, Kenya, Uganda) or on state / provincial governments 
(Maryland/Hawaii in US, British Columbia/Ontario in Canada, Mexico, India). Meanwhile other 
countries depend on central / state governments to set and monitor the fiscal cadastre and valuation 
standards (US, Mexico, NZ, Malaysia) (UN-HABITAT, 2011; De Cesare, 2012). Based on the 
subsidiarity principle, each country should “unbundle” its tax administration activities, assigning 
relevant functions to the appropriate government level. 
 There is very diverse experience in the functional division of property tax administrative 
responsibilities across levels of government. The fiscal cadastre/valuation functions are often under 
central government responsibility, unless local governments can demonstrate capacity (Colombia). 
In other countries local governments are given the responsibility, unless they transfer the 
responsibility to the higher level of government (Mexico). In some countries local governments are 
fully responsible for the fiscal cadastre, regardless of their institutional capacity (Brazil, Venezuela 
and Ecuador) (De Cesare, 2012).  
This division of responsibility and the role of the central and local governments in tax 
administration is a critical challenge currently facing the devolution of the property tax in Indonesia. 
According to Law 28 (2009), all administration responsibilities, including fiscal cadastre and 
valuation, are to be shifted to the local governments. A recent ADB study suggests that, while all 
local governments have the capacity to assume the treasury functions related to collection, only 
about 30% of the local governments could realistically assume the fiscal cadastre / valuation 
responsibilities in the short term with the remaining 300+ local governments (70 percent) needing 
some form of central administration and/or joint administration support for the medium to long 
term, as local capacity is increased over time (Kelly, 2011). 
 Capacity building and effective human resource management at the local government level 
are crucial to implementation success. To make best use of scarce capacity, reformers should clearly 
separate data collection functions from valuation functions. Property field information enumerators 
need to be experts in filling out the required property information forms and do not need to be 
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experts in valuation. Scarce valuation experts should focus on determining land value maps, 
building cost tables and other valuation-related models, which can be applied to the collected 
information in the fiscal cadastre. In many countries this will require a change in the law and/or 
regulations, which currently stipulate that the valuation roll (including the collection of property 
information) is the responsibility of a qualified valuer (Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa) 
(McCluskey, et al, 2003; Kelly, 2000). 
 Although government policy measures can facilitate the systematic maintenance of 
property-related information, the coverage ratio can only be substantially improved through 
adopting appropriate administrative procedures, relying on a partnership approach working with 
taxpayers, and 3
rd
 party agencies, taking advantage of the relative strengths of the central and local 
governments, providing capacity and incentives, and ensuring systematic and periodic cadastral 
information maintenance. Given the dynamic nature of urbanization, this is a continuous and 
information intensive activity.  
 Let us now turn our focus to the important valuation ratio.  
2.3.2 Exploring the Property Tax Valuation Ratio  
 The importance of the valuation ratio, as defined, applies only to property tax systems that 
levy taxes based on property value. Area-based systems only need accurate cadastre information on 
property characteristics. Valuation-based systems depend both on the quality of the cadastre 
information under the coverage ratio as well as the accuracy of property valuation estimates under 
the valuation ratio.  
 Case studies, especially in developing countries, suggest that the valuation ratio for 
properties may be no more than 30-40%, with large variations in the accuracy of the relative 
valuations (Bird and Slack, 2004, Kelly, 2000, De Cesare, 2012, UN-HABITAT, 2011). Although 
valuations may be relatively more accurate when first produced, this accuracy erodes over time due 
to shifts in relative and absolute market values. These low valuation ratios and the variation among 
the property values create efficiency and equity distortions, which impact the compliance level and 
the revenue yield from the property tax. 
 The purpose for property tax valuation is to determine the property tax amounts that each 
taxpayer will be expected to pay based on the relative property value vis a vis other taxpayers. 
Property valuation should be primarily undertaken to promote equity in the tax system so that 
properties of equal value should pay equal amounts; and not to determine the total level of tax 
liabilities. The absolute amount of the property tax revenue to be collected should be decided 
through a policy choice linked to property tax rates. If the government needs additional tax revenue 
in a particular year, the government should increase the tax rates, rather than solely adjusting the 
absolute or relative property valuations.  
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 The accuracy of the absolute and relative valuation ratios requires constant attention to 
ensure consistent and periodic updating of valuation rolls, so as to capture the changes in property 
market values. Within an appropriate legal and regulatory framework, countries need to adapt 
appropriate valuation standards tailored to institutional, system and human capacities and the 
availability of market-based information and appropriate valuation methodologies.  
 Although the absolute valuation level could be supported through indexing the tax base to 
an annual inflation rate, indexation itself does not adjust for the relative changes in value across 
properties. For those relative value changes, international best practice suggests that tax departments 
should update property values at least once every 3-5 years, perhaps annually in case of dramatic 
increases in property values. Frequent revaluations are important to maintain equity and revenues as 
well as to reduce taxpayer resistance to periodic large increases in property values.   
 Tax departments must be proactive in updating the valuations included in the tax rolls. This 
should be done through relying on valuation-related information from taxpayer declarations and 3
rd
 
party agency reports as well as a separate, integrated set of activities related to the collection and 
analysis of property market trends and linking property characteristics to changes in property value 
over time. This market trend analysis can then be used to update the property tax roll on a periodic 
basis. 
There is a continuum of valuation methodologies available—ranging from simple market 
based land value maps and building costs tables used throughout Latin America and SE Asia to the 
more complex statistical estimation models used largely in North America. A uniquely different 
market value approach is the ‘banding’ system in England, which classifies all residential 
properties, based on their estimated capital value, into 8 interval ‘bands’ of value (Plimmer, et al, 
2002). 
 To implement the range of simple to more complex valuation systems, all countries need to 
access, collect, manage, analyze and monitor market information on property prices in order to 
update the valuation roll. This information will largely come from third party sources such as 
conveyance documents, other government departments, banks and mortgage institutions, newspaper 
and other sources. Tax departments need to develop administrative procedures to systematically 
collect and analyze market value information from a variety of third party sources. This market 
value information can be used to develop land value zones and building cost tables under the simple 
market value based system or as inputs into various statistical models in those economies with easy 
access to quality market value information. The accuracy and equity on the valuations depends 
primarily on the quality of the available market information, not on the sophistication of the 
modeling.  
 To ensure consistency, transparency, accountability and equity in the property valuation and 
assessment process, all property tax systems must include an appeals and dispute resolution 
component. Taxpayers should be able to lodge an objection to the property assessment valuation 
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and/or the tax liability calculations based on that valuation. Such appeals systems are essential to 
help ensure that property valuations are fair and close to market value, which produces a more 
accurate and high valuation ratio. International best practice provides for both administrative and 
judicial appeals, with multiple levels to ensure fair, cost efficient and quick resolution. To avoid 
frivolous appeals, countries typically require a taxpayer to pay either all or a part of the property tax 
liability before being allowed to file a judicial proceeding. 
 Several countries are constrained in the valuation of rent controlled properties (Egypt, 
India). These laws and regulations control the setting of the rents, which in turn affects the property 
values determined for those properties. Rent control constrains the equity of the property tax system. 
For example, although residents living in rental control units use the same government services as 
residents in non-rental control units, those in rent control units are being subsidized by being 
charged less property tax. Property tax revenues needed by government to pay for local level 
services are therefore underfunded or governments are forced to shift a larger tax burden to those 
occupants living in non-rent control units. To circumvent this rent control constraint, many Indian 
states have successfully shifted towards a simplified area-based valuation approach, basing the 
property tax valuations on a unit area values based system rather than on the annual rents 
themselves (Mathur, et al, 2009, NIUA, 2011).  
  The valuation ratio is closely linked to the coverage ratio, as the combination of coverage 
and valuation determine the quality of the fiscal cadastre. The administrative procedures for 
capturing the taxpayer and tax property information, combined with the technical capacity and 
property valuation information needed to estimate valuations, are essential for ensuring that the 
valuation roll effectively captures the total potential property tax base. It is this potential tax base 
which is used by the tax department to levy the property liability for collection. 
  Let us now turn our focus to the important collection ratio.  
3.3 Exploring the Property Tax Collection Ratio 
 Property taxation is primarily an instrument designed to mobilize government revenue in an 
efficient and equitable manner, at the least economic, administrative and compliance cost. 
Identifying and valuing the tax base produces the valuation roll, which represents the potential legal 
tax base. Applying the tax rate to the valuation roll produces the tax roll, which represents the 
potential tax revenue. This potential tax revenue is then transformed into reality through the tax 
collection process. Without the ultimate tax collection, the property tax system will not be able to 
achieve the revenue, equity or efficiency goals.  
 Property tax collection levels vary considerably across countries. Collection rates in most 
OECD countries are close to 100%; while in most non-OECD countries collection ratios only 
range from an estimated 30-60 percent (Bird and Slack, 2004; Kelly 2000, 2012; NIUA, 2010; 
Youngman and Malme, 1994, 2002). These low collection ratios can be attributed to a 
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combination of political, cultural, administrative and personal reasons, requiring governments to 
implement policy and administrative changes to encourage voluntary compliance and to take 
decisive action to enforce against cases of non-compliance. 
To improve the collection ratio, countries should focus first priority on enhancing 
voluntary compliance, providing incentives to taxpayers to pay their taxes in a timely manner. 
Possible incentives can vary, from linking the property tax payment to improved public services, 
enhancing taxpayer service, reducing compliance costs, and providing discounts and incentives 
for timely and complete payment.  
Linking property tax revenue collection to a general improvement in public services is 
very important. The property tax, unlike user charges for direct services such as utilities, cannot 
be easily linked to a specific government service. Thus it is important that taxpayers understand 
the role of property tax as a general benefit tax linked to location-specific infrastructure and 
services, such as improved roads, drainage, and parks. To encourage this understanding, 
governments need to undertake taxpayer awareness and education, explaining the role and 
benefits of property taxation and, even, more importantly; governments must effectively use 
property tax revenues to deliver those improved public services in an efficient and accountable 
manner. 
 Taxpayer education programs are also critical to provide information on the property tax 
structure, payment procedures, appeals and dispute mechanisms, and enforcement provisions. 
This information, combined with simplified and easily accessible payment systems, can lower 
compliance costs and encourage voluntary compliance. In order to reduce administrative and 
compliance costs, countries are increasingly providing multiple convenient payment options 
through banks, post offices, ATM machines, or via internet, electronic checks and credit cards, and 
allowing for direct bank deductions and/or payments through cell phones credit transfers. Some 
countries try to link the property tax to the electricity or water bills to facilitate collection (Greece, 
El Salvador, South Africa).  
Effectively using social pressure to encourage property tax payment compliance has been 
effective in many countries. Publishing names of top compliant taxpayers publicly recognizes 
outstanding compliant taxpayers as positive role models, thereby helping to encourage voluntary 
compliance (Philippines, Indonesia). Other countries publish the names of the delinquent taxpayers, 
who are given advance notice to pay the tax to avoid the negative publicity (Kenya, Malawi, 
Tanzania). Some countries provide a direct monetary incentive to encourage compliance by 
giving a discount for those paying in a timely and complete manner (Philippines, Barbados, 
Ecuador, and Kenya) (Kelly, forthcoming).  
In addition to lowering compliance costs and providing incentives to encourage tax 
payments, countries also encourage voluntary compliance through applying stricter enforcement 
measures in the form of sanctions and penalties (eg, the imposition of late payment penalties, 
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possible interest payments, various sanctions such as the use of tax clearance certificates, tax 
liens, and penalties). Credible strict enforcement against non-compliance can encourage a culture 
of voluntary compliance to avoid being sanctioned or penalized.  
 In cases of non-compliance, countries apply sanctions and penalties. Sanctions can be 
applied to the withholding of location-specific public services (eg, building permits, business 
licenses, land/title registration, withholding and/or suspension of utilities) typically enforced 
through “tax clearance certificates.” Tax clearance certificates could also be required for private 
sector services (eg, financial institutions issuing mortgages or home equity loans) and other public 
sector departments and private sector agencies to promote collection compliance. 
 In addition to requiring tax clearance certificates, countries should be able to impose a tax 
lien (or encumbrance) on the title of a property to ensure tax payment when the property is sold or 
transferred. A tax lien on a property also affects the collateral value of a property for borrowing 
purposes. This tax lien approach should be encouraged for those properties in non-compliance with 
legal title. A combination of tax clearance certifications and tax liens can be quite effective to deter 
non-compliance. 
 To complement incentives and sanctions, countries should apply a system of progressively 
strict penalties to encourage compliance. These typically include the imposition of a lump sum 
payment penalty and/or a monthly interest payment for late payment to encourage compliance by 
increasing the cost for non-payment (Bahamas, Indonesia). Government policy should make interest 
payments for late property tax payment consistent with other major taxes, such as VAT and income 
taxes, and these should be set higher than the prime interest rate to encourage early tax payment.  
Ultimately these late payment and interest penalties must be enforced through tax debt 
recovery. Countries use various alternatives to secure legal debt recovery, including civil 
proceedings, the ability to garner wages and rents, seizure and sale of movable properties and/or the 
seizure and sale of immovable property (Philippines, Indonesia, US, Canada, Chile). Other options 
for enforcing property tax collections include linking the property tax to location specific 
services. For example, South Africa allows cutting electricity in cases of non-payment,
4
 while 
the court in Greece in 2012 has ruled that cutting electricity for non-payment would be 
unconstitutional.
5
 
In North America, tax departments ultimately rely on property seizure and auction to 
enforce compliance for tax nonpayment leading to collection rates close to 100 percent. In 
contrast, enforcement using seizure and auction in developing countries is very rare, with three 
                                                 
4
 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Power-to-Shabangus-property-cut-off-20120621 
5
 In 2012, the Greek High Court ruled that it would be unconstitutional to cut electricity for nonpayment of the 
property tax. http://articles.businessinsider.com/2012-03-02/europe/31115881_1_property-tax-ruling-
electricity#ixzz24Ph9gdUy)  
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documented exceptions: Philippines, Indonesia and Chile (Kelly, forthcoming). Each case 
illustrates the importance of strong political will and technical capacity to implement 
enforcement measures.  
Improving the collection ratio on land owned under lease rights present special challenges. 
While the government can take enforcement measures against freehold rights, through placing a lien 
against the property and ultimately selling the property to recover property tax debt, the 
government’s only option for properties under leasehold is to take action against the individuals or 
businesses owing the tax, such as attaching taxpayer wages and bank accounts, seizing taxpayer 
movable assets, or canceling property leases. In cases where the property ownership is not clearly 
defined, not registered and/or communally owned, tax departments can rely on moral persuasion, 
communal social pressure, and/or seizure of movable properties.  
 Some countries have used the private sector to assist in the tax collection process (Uganda, 
Pakistan) (UN-HABITAT, 2011). These private sector approaches, often used for collecting market 
fees or parking / bus park fees, have been used for property taxation as well. Contracts are typically 
structured as a lump sum payment through a bidding process, with the winning contractor able to 
keep any amounts collected over the contracted amounts. A best practice would be to allow the 
government to be responsible for collecting all current liabilities and delinquent accounts for up to a 
year, after which the outstanding accounts could be contracted to collection agencies and/or lawyers 
to take legal action for recovery. 
 Other countries engage neighborhood organizations (Paraguay), urban neighborhood 
governments (Philippines), and village and/or traditional leaders (Indonesia, Sudan, Ghana) to 
encourage tax compliance
6
. To mobilize their active support, governments typically provide a 
collection incentive or institute a system of shared revenue from the property tax to ensure a portion 
of the collected property tax revenue is retained at the lower government levels (Guevara, 2003). 
 In short, improving the tax collection ratio requires a comprehensive collection and 
enforcement approach to promote voluntary compliance through a combination of payment and 
collection incentives, sanctions and penalties, combined with the necessary political will to ensure 
follow up action be taken against noncompliance to the full measure of the law. Ultimately the 
property tax is primarily a fiscal instrument to provide government revenues, and thus, governments 
must establish an efficient and equitable tax collection system to ensure that the fiscal cadastre 
information can be transformed into government revenue (Kelly, forthcoming).  
 All administration reforms require strong political and technical support, legal authority, 
institutional capacity and financial and human resources to implement and sustain improvements 
in the collection, coverage and valuation ratios. Combining these key ingredients into a 
successful reform strategy is important to maximizing the chance of success and assessing risks 
                                                 
6
 See USAID (undated) for Paraguay, Kelly (1993) for Indonesia and Radio Miraya (2012) for Sudan.  
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of wrong sequencing, as well as synchronizing the reform effort to link effectively with the 
electoral, economic planning and financial budgeting cycles.  
Let us now explore issues of reform implementation strategy design.  
 Reform Implementation Strategy  
Reform implementation is always a major challenge. Changes always disturb the status 
quo, affecting existing stakeholders both inside and outside of government, creating losers and 
winners, as the system moves towards a more sustainable, efficient and equitable system of 
mobilizing revenues. Managing this change is a difficult process of political, technical, and 
social reengineering, simultaneously mobilizing sufficient support to overcome the natural 
resistance to change, while convincing the broader society of the inherent benefits to the 
proposed changes. This requires a mix of quick wins to overcome opposition and gain broader 
support, while allowing time to implement more systemic and institutional changes needed for 
sustainability. Designing and implementing the appropriate reform strategy is the true challenge 
facing reformers everywhere. It is the creative blend of the science and art within the entire 
reform process. 
 
As Machievelli observed in the 16
th
 century, 
 
 “… there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor 
more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer 
has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in 
all those who would profit by the new order, this luke warmness arising partly from 
fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their favour; and partly from the 
incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had 
the actual experience of it.'' (Machievelli)  
 
Designing an appropriate implementation strategy must recognize these natural areas of 
resistance and the importance of garnering broad political, technical and social support to ensure 
ownership of the reform objectives. This ownership of the reform, and the resulting commitment 
and support, is critical during the design and adoption phase, but perhaps even more important 
during the implementation phase, to ensure sustainability in the property tax system. Often the 
real impacts of a reform are not clear until the reform is being implemented. It is then that the 
various stakeholders see the reality of the policy and administrative choices made. It is then also 
that strong, sustained reform leadership is needed to sustain implementation and to effectively 
deal with stakeholders throughout the reform cycle to enable the reform objectives to be fully 
realized.  
 
Mobilizing the levels of reform support needed requires stakeholders to appreciate the 
costs and benefits of the reform, to engage in the debate and to develop a consensus on the need 
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for the reform, thereby gradually ensuring that the property reform becomes demand-driven by 
the broader community. Focusing solely on the property tax reforms in isolation limits the ability 
to mobilize the broad support needed for success. Thus it is important to broaden the agenda to 
include property tax reform as a requisite to broader decentralization reforms aimed at improving 
efficient and accountable public service delivery. Linking property revenue mobilization to 
improved public service expenditures will allow the government to mobilize a wider level of 
social support needed to implement and sustain property tax reform efforts.  
 
Linking the property tax reform to these other reforms needs to be a critical part of any 
reform implementation strategy. In addition to linking the property tax reform as an input to 
public sector management and decentralization reforms, it is equally crucial to ensure that other 
reforms which affect the property tax are effectively linked to the property tax reform strategy. 
For example, property tax reformers should be cognizant of ongoing reforms, such as those on 
land titling and registration, surveying and mapping, urban and rural development, land and 
property transfer taxes, housing and rent control, housing development and finance, 
infrastructure finance, water and sanitation management, and transportation, all of which can 
impact the design and implementation of a property tax reform. 
 
Designing and implementing successful reform requires strong leadership. Garnering the 
necessary political, technical, operational and social support needed for successful property tax 
reform requires strong leadership, not only at the top, but on many levels throughout the entire 
property tax system. Political leadership is required to ensure a sound policy and legal property 
tax framework. Technical leadership is required to lead the analytical process to understand and 
monitor the policy and administrative challenges, identify the needed changes and develop the 
systems and procedures for implementing the changes. Operational leadership is required to 
apply those policies and administration systems in the field, while social leadership is needed to 
mobilize the public, encourage voluntary compliance and ensure social accountability. Any 
reform implementation strategy should identify and empower leaders throughout the system with 
the authority, capacity and resources needed to support the reform effort.  
 Strong institutions are also essential to support the design and implementation of 
successful property tax reforms. Although the primary focus may be on the tax administration 
departments, successful reform depends on an array of supporting public and private institutions 
dealing with policy and administration aspects linked to land and mapping, property title 
registration, property valuation, public works, housing and infrastructure, business and economic 
development, banking and revenue management, media and communication networks, legal 
adjudication and enforcement and governance and social accountability, among others. In 
countries with relatively weak institutions, property tax reformers must recognize these 
constraints and the dynamic nature of institutional reform in order to develop appropriate 
strategies that can be implemented immediately, but which are flexible enough to adapt and grow 
with the improvements within the broader institutional environment. An important example is 
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the adoption of appropriate valuation methodologies, which can gradually improve as the 
supporting institutions are able to provide better quality property value information. 
In light of these various political, technical and institutional constraints, many countries 
have effectively adopted a pilot project approach to strategically design and implement changes 
in the property tax system. These pilot projects allow for field experimentation to develop 
systems and procedures, create opportunities for training and capacity building and provide a 
demonstration effect, all of which can help facilitate the successful reform roll out throughout the 
country, while limiting the political and financial risks of introducing new reform policies and 
procedures (Indonesia, Philippines and others) (Bird and Slack, 2004, Kelly, 2012; UN-
HABITAT, 2011). 
 
In addition to these broad issues, a successful property tax reform requires an 
understanding of the integrated connections within the property tax system. Policy decisions 
affect administration feasibility, while administration decisions affect the policy results. 
Reformers should choose an appropriate combination of complementary and supportive policy 
and administrative options, in order to successfully realize the property tax reform objectives. 
Similarly reformers must appreciate the integrated nature of a property tax administration 
system. Each administrative function of data collection, valuation, assessment, collection, 
enforcement and taxpayer service and dispute resolution is necessary to generate property tax 
revenue, equity and efficiency. Thus, in designing an implementation strategy, reformers need to 
think globally, but act strategically. It is important to remember that prioritization and 
sequencing are not the same thing, but understanding the contributing importance of each 
administration function to achieving the property tax goals can assist in correctly sequencing the 
reform activities. 
The key to property tax administration reform lies in finding how best to improve the 
coverage, valuation and/or collection ratios. While improvement in all three ratios is needed to 
achieve the potential revenue, equity and efficiency goals, it is the collection ratio that ultimately 
determines the realization of these goals. That is, without tax collection taking place, the 
potential revenue and equity impacts of the coverage and valuation will only remain hypothetical 
and not become a reality. Thus the collection ratio must function well, in order to enable 
governments to take advantage of improvements in coverage and valuation ratios.  
Understanding the relative priorities of each function, combined with a situational 
analysis of the current property tax system performance, the reformer should be able to identify 
an appropriate sequencing of reform activities. Where to start? Does one start by focusing on 
expanding the coverage ratio? Or does one start by increasing the level and accuracy of the 
valuation ratio? Or should one start by focusing on the collection and enforcement? Trying to 
improve all functions simultaneously ignores the importance of prioritization and sequencing, 
especially in reform environments with limited political, institutional, financial and human 
capacity. 
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In a stylized fashion, there are two basic sequencing strategies to undertaking a property 
tax reform process. Countries either tend to start with strengthening property tax collections (ie, 
the collection ratio) through a “collection led” strategy or they tend to start with strengthening 
the fiscal cadastre (ie, the coverage and valuation ratios) through a “valuation-pushed” strategy 
(Kelly, 1993,2000, forthcoming). Let us identify the underlying rationale and appropriateness of 
each stylized implementation strategy, with some country examples. 
 The collection-led strategy places priority on improving collection and enforcement, with 
taxpayer service. Secondary attention is placed on improving the quality of property information 
and the accuracy of property valuation. This sequencing strategy recognizes that the “collection” 
function is what “realizes” the revenue, equity, efficiency and accountability objectives of the 
property tax. Improved tax mapping, fiscal cadastre information and property valuations linked to 
the coverage and valuation ratios are seen as secondary, but complementary to the collection 
process.   
 The collection-led strategy recognizes that a credible collection and enforcement process 
becomes a catalyst to drive further reforms to improve the coverage and valuation ratios. That is, it 
is only when property tax is actually collected and enforcement is a reality that taxpayers have a 
very keen interest to ensure that the property tax physical information and property values are 
accurate. Taxpayers then worry about appealing the property values to ensure they are not forced to 
pay taxes based on an inaccurate valuation. Without tax enforcement, taxpayers have the option just 
to ignore inaccurate property information and valuations by ignoring the property tax payment 
itself. Focusing on property tax collections sets in place the incentives for higher voluntary 
compliance and more active taxpayer participation, exerting pressure on tax administration to ensure 
accuracy in the property and valuation information. 
 This collection-led strategy approach was introduced in Indonesia following the enactment 
of the Land and Building Tax in 1986. The Indonesia strategy placed priority on the introduction of 
an effective payment collection monitoring system, which led to a credible delinquency list, thereby 
enabling government to undertake a historic seizure to enforce payment compliance in 1991 (Kelly, 
1993). To build on the collection-led success, the reform introduced major improvements in 
improved property tax administration linked to the fiscal cadastre, including property valuation 
(Kelly, 1996). This focus on collections lasted from 1988 to 1994, after which tax administration 
has been focusing more on routine fiscal cadastre and property valuation maintenance, to the neglect 
of systematic property tax enforcement. This said, it is important to note that the current, ongoing 
reform in Indonesia is transforming the shared property tax system to become a devolved own-
source tax revenue system, now opening up 400+ opportunities for Indonesian local governments to 
possibly adopt and implement an effective local-government level collection-led strategy (Kelly, 
2012).  
 A second, perhaps more successful, collection-led strategy experience is the case of Quezon 
City (Philippines). Through a combination of strong local political and technical support, Quezon 
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has been able to sustain the collection-led strategy for over a decade. Quezon has actively pursued a 
collection led strategy, which blends voluntary compliance and strict enforcement, and is 
complemented by high quality taxpayer service and improvements in the fiscal cadastre and 
property valuation maintenance (Ignacio, 2005).  
 Both the Indonesia and Quezon cases show us the necessary ingredients for successful 
reform: strong political leadership, excellent technical support and the successful delivery of quality 
taxpayer education and awareness, lowering compliance costs, and ensuring equitable 
implementation of the property tax system. Although both cases followed a collection-led strategy, 
Quezon City appears more successful in sustaining the strategy. Quezon directly linked their 
property tax reform to local government management reforms, connecting the enhanced revenues 
with expenditures on improved local services. With its property tax as a local tax, Quezon City was 
able to successfully mobilize broad stakeholder support, by linking the improved property tax 
mobilization with improved service delivery. This case clearly demonstrates how linking property 
tax reform to decentralization and local government service delivery reforms is crucial to ensure a 
sustainable property tax reform implementation. 
 In contrast to the collection-led strategy, most countries follow a valuation-pushed 
implementation strategy. This approach places top priority on updating the property tax roll, through 
expanding the fiscal cadastre and improving the accuracy of property valuations. This approach 
assumes that major improvements in property tax yield will come from improving property 
valuations. The assumption is that the non-valuation administrative functions are fully functional, 
with the major constraint being low and inaccurate values.  
 Although this may be true in many OECD countries, this is typically not true in developing 
countries. Focusing on the fiscal cadastre and related improvements in property valuation is not 
necessarily as useful, when there is a primary problem of inadequate political will, collections 
and enforcement. At the same time, relying on a one-time valuation roll creation exercise, even 
by the private sector, may be expedient but not necessarily useful unless institutional capacity is 
simultaneously developed to ensure that the coverage and valuation ratios can be maintained 
over time and used to generate improved revenues. 
 A classic example of a valuation-pushed strategy was the USAID Real Property Tax 
Administration project in the Philippines in the 1980s. This reform initiative saw property tax 
revenues increase by less than 1 percent following a multi-million dollar project (Dillinger, 1988). 
Another example was the World Bank supported property tax reform in Tanzania in the mid to late 
1990s (Kelly and Musunu, 2000; McCluskey, et al, 2003). Unfortunately, almost all ongoing 
property tax reforms around the world are being structured as valuation-pushed reforms, placing 
priority on GIS-based tax maps, new valuation techniques while neglecting improvement in tax 
collection. 
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 Within the context of these two stylized extremes, each country should identify the 
appropriate priorities and sequencing to strategically implement the reform. All administrative 
reforms need to be comprehensive, targeted strategically to ensure success in increasing the 
various ratios, leading to sustainable property revenue mobilization. Although each situation 
differs, it is critical that reformers think strategically in choosing the appropriate mix of policy 
and administrative reforms and identifying the appropriate sequencing of those reform 
components.  
 Property tax reforms which are introducing new systems for the first time start by building 
the fiscal cadastre, perhaps by initially introducing a pure area-based system and putting in the 
necessary collection and enforcement mechanisms (Hergesia) (UN-HABITAT, 2011). Over time 
the area-based system can switch to a valuation based system, while maintaining the progress in 
overall property tax administration (Croatia, 2012). The key is to target the intervention appropriate 
to the situation, but always keeping in mind the critical importance of property tax collection and 
enforcement to ensure that potential can be turned into the reality.  
 In OECD countries, with functioning collection and enforcement systems and related 
supportive institutions, a valuation-pushed strategy may also be the appropriate choice. However, in 
most developing countries, a more comprehensive approach is warranted following a collection-led 
implementation strategy. In those countries which already have an operational property tax system 
which is confronted by low levels of collection, coverage and valuation ratios, it is suggested that a 
collection-led strategy may be the more appropriate approach (eg, India).  
 Overall emphasis should be placed on ensuring that the property tax reform places proper 
attention to the collection and enforcement of the tax system, mobilizing the political will and 
ensuring the availability of legally enforceable enforcement procedures, accompanied by the needed 
improvements in ensuring the highest coverage and valuation ratios. Revenue collection is the 
ultimate objective of a tax system, with the mapping, fiscal cadastre and valuation activities 
supportive components to the collection function. Without the ultimate collection of the tax, the 
property tax system will not achieve revenue, equity or efficiency goals.  
 Although policy choices affect the potential property tax liability to be collected, it is the 
administration choices which directly affect the level of tax effort, that portion of tax capacity that 
can be realized. This being said, however, inappropriate and/or complicated tax policy can make tax 
administration costly and/or impossible to effectively implement. Thus, reformers should carefully 
evaluate the policy alternatives, so as to choose tax policy options, which are implementable within 
the legal and institutional environment. The general rule is to keep the policy simple and 
appropriately tailored to the existing reform environment, cognizant of political will, legal structure, 
institutional capacity across property-related agencies, level of available property and market value 
information, human resource capacity and financial resources.  
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 Let us now conclude by summarizing key recommendation for making the property tax 
work. 
4. Summary Thoughts for Making the Property Tax Work  
 Theory and international experience identify an extensive array of best practices related 
to successful design and implementation of property taxation. The challenge for each country is 
to identify the right mix of policy and administration choices, molding and adapting them to each 
unique reform environment, in order to lay the foundation for strategically implementing 
sustainable property tax reform. This paper closes by summarizing several key recommendations 
for helping make the property tax work in developing and transitional countries. 
 Countries should link property tax reform to broader public sector management 
reforms. Property tax reform should not be seen as an independent reform to be 
implemented in isolation. Rather, property tax reform must be recognized as a supportive 
input to broader public sector management reforms aimed at improving governance and 
public services. This would help link revenue mobilization and improved services, a 
necessary ingredient to encourage voluntary compliance.  
Public finance experts widely recognize the property tax as the ideal local tax. It has 
substantial revenue potential, with minimal efficiency distortions. It is able to capture 
location-specific net benefits and is relatively easy to administer. In addition the property tax 
is highly visible and politically sensitive, thus making it an excellent tax to generate local 
government revenues while forcing a degree of public and social accountability.  
By recasting the property tax reform as an essential requisite for successful decentralization, 
property tax reforms can take advantage of the broader reform momentum, along with 
political, technical and popular support, and access to human and financial resources needed 
for success. The property tax reform can serve as a possible cornerstone for empowering 
local governments with a degree of financial resources in an efficient and accountable 
manner.  
 Countries should adopt appropriate policy. Ultimately property tax policy choices must be 
implementable to realize the revenue, efficiency and equity results. Therefore policy choices 
need to be adopted, cognizant of the institutional and administrative constraints, recognizing 
that these policy choices be structured to evolve over time in line with improvements in the 
broader reform environment and administrative capacity. All reforms are dynamic, thus 
requiring government to systematically monitor and periodically adjust the property tax 
policy options to ensure effective implementation and achievement of the expected revenue, 
equity and efficiency objectives.  
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Reformers must focus on the tax base and tax rate choices, always bearing in mind the need 
for simplicity to enable implementation. Policy reform, especially in developing countries, 
should rationalize exemptions so as to limit tax expenditures, reduce excessively generous 
tax breaks, and target tax relief more effectively to reduce revenue loss, inequities and 
inefficiencies. Exempted properties, and those receiving tax reliefs, should be required to 
submit a formal request to facilitate a periodic review process. A situation of “once 
exempted, always exempted” should be avoided.  
Tax rate structures should be kept uniform, to the extent possible. Classified tax rate systems, 
if adopted, should be limited to few categories, such as residential, non-residential and 
agricultural properties. Progressive property tax rates should be avoided. Governments need 
to focus on realizing property tax equity, efficiency and revenue policy objectives through 
improvements in administration. 
 Countries should focus priority on improving property tax administration. Priority must 
be placed on property tax administration to ensure that the coverage, valuation and 
collections ratios are close to 100%. The weakest link in property tax reforms, especially in 
developing countries, is the quality of tax administration. Cognizant of the institutional, 
systems and human capacity constraints, countries must adopt simplified data capture, data 
management and tax mapping procedures, appropriate valuation methodologies, transparent 
assessment procedures, accountable collection mechanisms, effective enforcement systems 
and targeted taxpayer service. These administrative procedures should be integrated into a 
computer-assisted administration system which can improve the speed and accuracy of data 
management, valuation, billing, collection, enforcement and taxpayer service, as needed.  
Ultimately all tax departments should be rationalized, unbundling the functions, allocating 
those functions to the level of government and/or to the private sector based on factors such 
as efficiency, accountability, economies of scale, need for equity, need to avoid conflict of 
interest, and need to mobilize political will. Doing so will improve the cost effectiveness, 
equity and efficiency of tax administration. A transitional, incremental approach should be 
adopted to phase in the reform implementation tailored to the absorptive capacity of the tax 
administration and the taxpaying public.  
 Countries should implement property tax reforms in a comprehensive, yet strategic 
manner. Property taxation is ultimately a revenue instrument, which should generate 
revenues as efficiently and equitably as possible, while minimizing economic, administrative 
and compliance costs. The property tax administration is neither a mapping agency nor a 
valuation agency; all mapping and valuation functions are intermediate prerequisites needed 
to enable tax departments to collect revenue. Priority must be placed on collection functions, 
as it is ultimately only through tax collection that the revenue, efficiency and equity 
objectives can be achieved.  
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Countries must recognize that an effective tax collection function is only possible, however, 
if supported by an effective supportive system of tax base coverage and valuation. Therefore 
countries must implement a strategic combination of policy and administration reforms to 
improve coverage, valuation and collection ratios. While analyzing the property tax system 
comprehensively, all countries must identify the specific areas of reform intervention and 
sequence those interventions to ensure results. 
In general, however, a critical priority, at least in most developing countries, should be on 
improving the collection system. Tax policy which is not collected / implemented will not 
generate the intended revenues, efficiency and equity objectives. International experience 
would suggest the need to adopt a ‘collection-led’ implementation strategy, supplemented by 
improvements in the coverage and valuations. Revenue collection is the ultimate objective of a 
tax system, with the mapping, fiscal cadastre and valuation activities supportive components to 
the collection function. Without the ultimate collection of the tax, the property tax system will 
not achieve revenue, equity or efficiency goals. 
 Countries must recognize that property tax reform is a long-term process. Property tax 
policy can be changed overnight through passing a law and/or changing policy regulations. 
However, implementing those policy changes into “realized” policy success in terms of 
revenues, equity and efficiency will take time. Policy changes must be translated into reality 
through effective administrative processes which require sustained political will, operational 
and technical capacity, systems and procedures, funding and time to be successfully 
implemented.  
In sequencing the reform it is always important to phase in “quick wins”, giving time for 
more long-term systemic and institutional changes. Countries operating with manual systems 
need time to transform policy changes into results, using pilot projects to test reform 
procedures, for further replication. Countries operating a pure area-based system will need 
time to evolve toward valuation-based system, as valuation-related information and capacity 
is developed to improve buoyancy and equity of the property tax system. Countries must 
focus on a comprehensive approach to property tax reform to ensure improvements in 
collection, valuation and coverage ratios. International experience suggests that nationwide 
property tax reforms can take 5 to 15 years to realize sustainable results. 
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